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Abstract An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements con-
cerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the
argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique
hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been pro-
posed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require
defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues
(Go´mez-Torrente (2016) Nouˆs 50(1): 3–40),. In (Hansen (2015)), I argued that the
recent objectivist response doesn’t apply to comparative occurrences of color adjec-
tives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation
remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address
several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument
from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist
reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation.
1 Introduction: Interpersonal Variation and Color Metaphysics
Experimental participants with “normal” color perception who are shown monochro-
matic lights or chips that reflect lights of different dominant wavelengths disagree
to a surprising extent when asked to identify which lights or chips are examples of
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“unique” hues.1 The unique hues (unique red, blue, green, yellow) were identified by
the German psychologist Ewald Hering (1920) as those hues that are phenomenolog-
ically “pure” or “unmixed”: unique red appears to contain no blue or yellow, unique
yellow appears to contain no blue or green, unique blue appears to contain no red or
yellow, and unique green appears to contain no blue or yellow. The most dramatic
variation occurs with judgments about unique green: different experimental partici-
pants identify stimuli ranging anywhere from 490nm to 555nm as unique green. This
is such a broad range that it overlaps with the area within which some participants
locate unique blue (458nm–495nm) on one side and unique yellow (544nm–594nm)
on the other (Kuehni 2004, p. 161).2
Block (1999, p. 43), discussing the variation in judgments about unique green
among 50 normal perceivers reported in Hurvich et al. (1968), draws the following
table that represents the variation:
5 subjects located unique green at 490 nm
11 at 500 nm
15 at 503 nm
12 at 507 nm
5 at 513 nm
2 at 517 nm
Block describes the “upshot” of the variation as follows: “if we take a chip that
any one subject in this experiment takes as being unique green, most of the others
will see it as at least slightly bluish or yellowish” (p. 43).3
This widespread disagreement about where to locate the unique hues has played an
important role in arguments that target theories of color that identify colors with phys-
ical properties of objects (surface spectral reflectances, for example). Cohen (2009,
Ch. 2) sets out a “master argument form” for arguments from perceptual variation, of
which the argument from interpersonal variation in the location of the unique hues
is one version. What follows is one way of partially filling in a version of Cohen’s
master argument form (Cohen 2009, p. 24) with facts regarding variation about the
location of the unique hues (green in particular):
1. Variation: Normal observers disagree in their judgments about where to locate
unique green when presented with colored stimuli of a particular wavelength. An
observer, Wy, may judge that a 500nm stimulus is unique green, for example,
1See Hurvich et al. (1968) and Kuehni (2004) for the relevant experiments, and see Hardin (1988), Block
(1999), and Cohen (2009) for discussion of the experiments’ philosophical significance.
2Kuehni generates these large ranges from responses to different experiments. Allen (2010) worries that
differences in experimental conditions across different studies, notably differences in light intensity, might
problematize combining results in this way.
3Note that Block refers to the observers in the Hurvich et al. (1968) experiment as responding to “chips”,
but the experimental set up involved the observers viewing “the exit slit of a Farrand monochomator”
through “a monocular short focus telescope”, and adjusting the wavelengths that the monochromator
transmitted “until the test field he saw was a green that was neither yellowish nor bluish in appearance”
(p. 67).
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while another observer, Zed, may judge that the same stimulus is not unique
green (because it is too bluish).
2. Ecumenism: There is no good reason to think that one normal observer’s judg-
ment that x is unique green (not at all bluish or yellowish) is veridical while
another normal observer’s judgment that x is not unique green (because it is
bluish) is not. Either both judgments are veridical, or neither is.4
3. Anti-irrealism: The idea that neither judgment is veridical (perhaps because
colors aren’t properties of external objects) is implausible.
4. So (from 1-3) we have reason to think that both judgments (x is unique green
and x is not unique green) are veridical.
5. But if both judgments are veridical, then they must not contradict one another.
6. The best to way to reconcile the apparently contradictory judments (Wy: x is
unique green vs. Zed: x is not unique green) is. . .
There are competing ways of completing the final part of the argument from
interpersonal variation and avoiding the appearance of problematic contradictory
judgments about the location of the unique hues. For example, relationalists (Cohen
2009 e.g.) complete the argument by arguing that colors are relations between objects
and various parameters (including perceiving subjects), and since the parameters of
the two seemingly contradictory judgments are different, the contradiction is merely
apparent.5 And color “pluralists” or “selectionists” (Allen 2009; Kalderon 2007;
Mizrahi 2006) complete the argument from interpersonal variation by arguing that
different observers pick up on (‘select’) different, non-relative, properties possessed
by the stimulus. The veridicality of the seemingly contradictory judgments is due to
different observers “perceiving different families of colors” (Kalderon 2007, p. 593)
that inhere in the stimulus.6
2 Go´mez-Torrente’s Semantic Response to the Argument
from Interpersonal Variation
Go´mez-Torrente (2016) rejects both relationalism and selectionism as satisfactory
ways of preserving the veridicality of apparently contradictory judgments about
the location of the unique hues, and he rejects a standard objectivist response that
involves denying premise (2), ecumenism. He rejects Kalderon’s version of selection-
ism on the grounds that it “doesn’t appeal to any sort of relativization that could make
4The “ecumenism” label comes from Cohen (2009, p. 24) via Logue (2016). Support for ecumenism
comes from the failure to find any satisfying, non-arbitrary way of identifying which judgment about the
location of unique green is veridical—for example in terms of the judgments of a “normal” or “standard”
perceiver. See Cohen (2009, pp. 31–33) and Hardin (1988 ,pp. 67–82) for reasons in favor of thinking that
there isn’t any such satisfying standard that identifies the correct location for the unique hues.
5For example, two observers, Wy and Zed, who make apparently contradictory judgments about the loca-
tion of the unique hues, turn out to be making judgments that are not in fact contradictory: The 500nm
stimulus is unique green according to standard W vs. The 500nm stimulus is not unique green according
to standard Z.
6The 500nm stimulus is unique greenf amilyW vs. The 500nm stimulus is not unique greenf amilyZ .
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the properties [green but neither somewhat yellow nor somewhat blue and green but
somewhat blue] compatible” (p. 7), and so can’t offer a satisfying way of explaining
how apparently contradictory judgments about the location of the unique hues can
both be veridical. I think Kalderon’s notion of colors belonging to “different families”
might be capable of addressing this worry, but I won’t explore that option here.7
Go´mez-Torrente rejects relationalist theories that hold that colors are consti-
tuted by a relation to an experiencing subject because there is, he thinks, “an
extended. . . impression that the color properties are physical properties ‘out there’,
not involving subjects or perceptual relations at all” (p. 6).8 And he thinks that subjec-
tivist relationalism implies that color properties have unintuitive modal properties—
specifically, that it predicts that statements like (1) should sound true, because on the
subjectivist relationalist view, (1) expresses something like (2) (which is true), when
in fact it should sound false (according to Go´mez-Torrente’s intuitions and those of
his informants):
(1) If my eyes were just a bit different, this stimulus would stop being unique green.
(2) If my eyes were just a bit different, this stimulus would stop being unique green
(to me).9
Go´mez-Torrente also rejects attempts to respond to the argument from interper-
sonal variation that deny premise (2), ecumenism. It is possible to deny premise (2)
by holding both that (a) we don’t have any independent and well-motivated reason for
singling out some particular judgment about unique green as veridical at the expense
of all other conflicting judgments and that (b) there is (still) such a correct judgment.
It’s possible to hold both (a) and (b) if it’s the case that we just don’t know which
judgment is veridical and which isn’t (Byrne and Hilbert 2003, p. 17; Tye (2006)).
Go´mez-Torrente (2016, p. 7) finds this reply “very unconvincing”, because:
We have no clue as to what fact of the matter, if this is to be describable in terms
of the relevant known physics and physiology, could make BG [the subject who
judges that a particular stimulus is not unique green] or UG [the subject who
judges that the same stimulus is unique green] or some other subject be in the
right to the exclusion of the others. Moreover, in part because of this, but also
insofar as purely linguistic judgments are concerned, neither BG nor UG would
seem to have made any mistake in their use of color words. It is hard to avoid
the conclusion that objectivist accounts that respected the impression that all
the subjects are equally right would enjoy a definite advantage over this kind of
reaction.
7See Logue (2016, p. 216) for a discussion of this issue.
8The intuition that experience presents colors as being non-relational is widely shared among philosophers
of color. See Cohen (2009, pp. 154–159) for a list of those reporting the intuition, and for a compelling
challenge to the significance of the experience of colors as non-relational for relational theories of color.
9For what it’s worth, I don’t share the truth-value judgment reported by Go´mez-Torrente and his infor-
mants about (1), but assessing the adequacy of Go´mez-Torrente’s challenges to pluralism and subjectivist
relationalism are not my main concern in this paper. Instead, I’m interested in Go´mez-Torrente’s own
promising semantic way of preserving the veridicality of both apparently contradictory judgments in the
argument from interpersonal variation.
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Fig. 1 Wy’s standards on the dimension of temperature
Go´mez-Torrente sets out to give an objectivist account that has such an advantage
by respecting ecumenism, and which avoids the problems he identifies with both
subjectivist relationalism and Kalderon’s pluralism. His account offers a linguistic
response to the argument from interpersonal variation, by showing how it is possible
for there to be judgments that disagree about the location of the unique hues, and
which look contradictory, but which can simultaneously be veridical.10 He does so
by drawing an analogy between color adjectives (“green”, “blue”, etc.) and gradable
adjectives that project objects onto scales that order objective magnitudes.11
A standard semantics for gradable adjectives like “tall” and “hot” associates such
expressions with functions from objects to degrees on a scale (Bartsch and Vennemann
1972; Cresswell 1977; Kennedy 1999). A scale is a set of degrees ordered along some
dimension (height, temperature, etc.). Relative adjectives like “tall” and “hot” require
a value for a contextually variable standard in order to generate a traditional prop-
erty of objects (a function from objects to truth-values): When Wy and Zed describe
something as “hot”, their intentions fix different standards that something must meet
or exceed on the scale of hotness in order to count as hot. 35 degree water may count
as hot according to Zed’s standard, but may not count as hot according to Wy’s stan-
dard, for example.12 Figures 1 and 2 show that by setting the standards for what
counts as “hot” in different places, Wy and Zed can disagree over whether something
is hot (e.g., water that is 35oC): Wy will judge that it isn’t hot, and Zed will judge
that it is.13
The adjectives “tall” and “hot”, though they have standards that may differ
between subjects, still order objects along scales that measure objective dimensions:
namely height and temperature, respectively. When standards are set in different
places on the scale of hotness (which is a way of ordering the underlying objective
dimension of temperature), it is possible for two people to make apparently contra-
dictory judgments (x is hot and x is not hot), that are nevertheless both veridical.
When Zed says “x is hot” (in a context where his standard for what counts as hot is
being at least 35oC), he says something true just in case x has a temperature of at
least 35oC. When Wy says “x is not hot” (in a context where his standard for what
10The remainder of this section and Section 3 are drawn from Hansen (2015), with some modifications.
11Though his argument turns on features of color language, Go´mez-Torrente argues that his conclusions
about language extend to color experience on the “natural” supposition that “the color properties signified
by color words are represented by color experience” (p. 4).
12Go´mez-Torrente draws on the degree-based semantics for gradable adjectives given in Kennedy (2007).
For an application of that degree-based semantics to gradable color adjectives, see Kennedy and McNally
(2010) and Hansen (2011).
13Figures 1 and 2 are based on Go´mez-Torrente (2016, Fig. 1).
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Fig. 2 Zed’s standards on the dimension of temperature
counts as hot is being at least 40oC), what he says is true just in case x doesn’t have
a temperature of at least 40oC. So when x is 35oC, Wy can truly say “x is not hot”
and Zed can truly say that “x is hot”.14 Even though the way content is fixed involves
subjective aspects of speakers (their intentions, e.g.), the content that is thereby fixed
can be objective (“x is hot” is true just in case x has a temperature of at least 40oC,
e.g.) (Go´mez-Torrente 2016, pp. 8–9).
Go´mez-Torrente’s central claim is that color adjectives operate the same way as
“hot” and “tall”: the appearance of interpersonal disagreements over whether some-
thing is unique green or not stem from locating the relevant standard in different
places on a scale of hue that is a way of ordering degrees on an underlying objective
dimension.15 Different degrees on the objective dimension can then be ordered into a
scale of hues, as in Figs. 3 and 4 (which are based on Go´mez-Torrente (2016 Fig. 2)).
If color adjectives like “green” have varying standards in the same way that “tall”
and “hot” do, then disagreements over whether some hue is unique green or not can
be explained as disagreements over where the standards of greenness are located on
the scale of hues. So, for example, Wy may judge that a stimulus, x, consisting of
500nm monochromatic light is unique green, while Zed judges that x is not unique
green (because it’s too blue). In so judging, Wy would be saying something true just
in case x is located between 490nm (his standard for what makes something count as
minimally blue) and 510nm (his standard for what makes something count as mini-
mally yellow) (see Fig. 3). Zed’s judgment that x is not unique green would be true
just in case x is not located between 500nm (his standard for what makes something
count as minimally blue) and 520nm (his standard for what makes something count
as minimally yellow). (See Fig. 4).
If that approach is right, then the phenomenon of intersubjective variation in judg-
ments about unique hues is compatible with a (non-selectionist) objectivist view of
color—it can be understood as the result of locating the relevant standards for, e.g.,
“blue”, “green”, and “yellow” in different places on the scale of hues.
14The apparent disagreement between Wy and Zed in such a situation might be explained in terms of a
disagreement over what the relevant standard for being hot is or should be, not what the temperature of the
object is. See Plunkett and Sundell (2013) for a discussion of this kind of “metalinguistic” disagreement.
15Go´mez-Torrente wants to remain neutral between competing objectivist accounts of what the colors are,
so he lets the variable h stand for a degree on whatever objective dimension (dominant wavelength, e.g.)
is supposed to correspond to the hue dimension.
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Fig. 3 Wy’s standards
3 A Comparative Version of the Argument from Interpersonal Variation
Go´mez-Torrente provides a way for an objectivist about color to preserve ecumenism
in the argument from interpersonal variation, while preserving the idea that the ref-
erence of particular uses of “unique green” (when combined with a contextually
variable standard) is a non-subject-relative property—having a particular dominant
wavelength, for example. While I find Go´mez-Torrente’s argument appealing, in
Hansen (2015) I argued that there is a variant of the argument from interpersonal
variation that makes it difficult for the (non-selectionist) objectivist to embrace both
the idea that uses of color adjectives refer to purely objective properties and that the
conflicting judgments of normal observers are veridical. The variant of the argument
that I gave involves comparative judgments of hue (x is greener than y), rather than
categorical judgments (x is unique green).
If Wy thinks that h is unique green, and Zed doesn’t, then they will also disagree
about whether h is greener than certain other stimuli or not. For example,Wywill find
a 500nm stimulus greener than a 510nm stimulus, and Zed will find a 510nm stimulus
greener than a 500nm stimulus (see Figs. 3 and 4). This is not just a difference in
whereWy and Zed locate their standards for greenness on a single, shared hue scale—
it is a difference in howWy and Zed order hues on different scales of greenness. This
marks an important difference between the scales associated with color adjectives
and the scales associated with adjectives like “tall” and “hot”.
To bring out the difference, consider the fact that if Wy and Zed disagree about
which of two objects is taller or hotter, then one of them has to be making a mistake.
That’s because there’s no room for subjectively different orderings of the degrees
associated with the objective dimensions of height and temperature. Imagine how
Fig. 4 Zed’s standards
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odd “tall” and “hot” would look if it were possible for two people to (veridically)
disagree about the ordering of degrees on the dimensions of height and temperature:
• Wy: 40oC is hotter than 35oC.
• Zed: 40oC is not hotter than 35oC.
Only if Zed is using “hotter” (or one of the other words in the sentence) to mean
something idiosyncratic could what he says be veridical.
That’s not the case with color adjectives. Wy and Zed can disagree about the proper
ordering of objects in terms of how green they are while both still making veridical
judgments. That means that they are operating with different scales of greenness
(since a scale is a particular ordering of a set of degrees along a dimension).16 So
the analogy that Go´mez-Torrente draws between color adjectives and adjectives like
“tall” and “hot” breaks down in an important way.
Proponents of the subject-relativity of color might point out that color adjectives
look closer to predicates of personal taste (which measure objects along subject-
relative dimensions if anything does) in that both involve subjective variability in
scales, not just standards on scales. There is nothing problematic about two subjects
who rank the “tastiness” of foods in different ways, for example. But it would be
hasty to conclude from the fact that color adjectives involve subjective variability
in scales that those scales don’t order a single underlying objective dimension (of
dominant wavelengths, for example) in different ways. Consider a type of adjective
that serves Go´mez-Torrente’s purposes better than “tall” and “hot”, namely adjec-
tives that (a) involve an objective underlying dimension, and (b) involve a focal point
standard that objects can diverge from in two directions. “Mild” is such an adjective:
it involves a focal point that objects can diverge from in two directions on the dimen-
sion of temperature: x can be milder than y because it is colder than y (if y is hot), or
because it is hotter than y (if y is cold).
On the standard semantics for gradable adjectives that Go´mez-Torrente invokes, a
comparative construction (“x is hotter than y”, “x is greener than y”) is true just in
case x has a greater degree on the relevant scale (hotness, greenness) than y. How
might the semantics of comparative occurrences of adjectives like “x is milder than
y” be handled? One straightforward possibility would be to give the truth conditions
of such statements in terms of “closeness” to the relevant standard: Wy’s judgment
that 500nm is greener than 510nm is true just in case 500nm is closer to what he con-
siders to be unique green (500nm) than 510nm is. Assuming that identity is maximal
closeness, then because 500nm is what Wy judges to be unique green, his judgment
500nm is greener than 510nm is true. Zed’s judgment that 510nm is greener than
500nm is true just in case 510nm is closer to what he considers to be unique green
(510nm) than 500nm is. Since a 510nm stimulus is what Zed judges to be unique
green, then his judgment is true. And it seems that the truth conditional content of
16See Kennedy (2013, p. 267), who observes that “evaluative” predicates, such as predicates of per-
sonal taste, give rise to “faultless disagreement” with comparatives, while “dimensional” predicates
(like “colder”/“richer”/“taller”/“heavier”/“older”) do not allow faultless disagreement in their comparative
forms. See also Bylinina (2013), McNally and Stojanovic (2014), Solt (2016), and Umbach (2016).
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Fig. 5 Disagreement in comparative judgments (across unique green)
both judgments can be spelled out purely objectively, in terms of the objective prop-
erties 500nm and 510nm, with subjective features of Wy and Zed only playing a role
in fixing the relevant contents.
But (I argued in Hansen (2015)), a key aspect of the truth conditional content of
the comparative color judgments, the notion of closeness to unique green, can’t plau-
sibly be defined without invoking a subject-relative property, even once interpersonal
differences in what counts as unique green are fixed to objective properties (500nm
or 510nm, e.g.). That’s because there can be interpersonal variation in judgments
about which stimuli are closer to unique green.
For example, assume that Wy and Zed are participating in an experiment where
they are presented with monochromatic light stimuli, and that both judge that light at
500nm is unique green.17 But even if they locate unique green in the same place on
the objective dimension of wavelength (500nm, say) they can disagree about whether,
e.g., light at 490nm (shifted towards blue) or at 510nm (shifted towards yellow) is
greener (closer to unique green). (See Fig. 5).
If both Wy and Zed’s judgments in such a situation are veridical, then that means
that closeness to unique green can’t be defined in terms of distance along the dimen-
sion of wavelength. A partial explanation for the fact that this type of comparative
variation is possible is the existence of lower-level physiological differences between
subjects (screening pigments or numbers of cone types, e.g. (Malkoc et al. 2005, p.
2155)), or higher-level differences between subjects (past visual experiences, e.g.
(Hinks et al. 2007, p. 3371)), which would contribute to an explanation for why one
subject might be more sensitive to differences on the blue side of unique green, while
another might be more sensitive to differences on the yellow side.
So, assuming the veridicality of bothWy and Zed’s comparative judgments of hue,
the truth conditions for comparative judgments of hue (x is greener than y) involve an
element that looks like it can’t be spelled out in non-subject-involving terms, namely
closeness to unique green. If that’s right, that would block Go´mez-Torrente’s attempt
to show that subjective features only play a content-fixing role and don’t contribute
to the truth conditional content of judgments involving color adjectives. Whether the
relevant notion of closeness can be spelled out in non-subject-involving terms will be
discussed in detail in Section 5.
17See Volbrecht et al. (1997) for an example of an experiment evaluating the location of unique hues
involving monochromatic light against different backgrounds.
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The traditional argument from interpersonal variation can therefore be reformu-
lated in comparative terms, as follows:
1. Variation: Normal observers disagree in their judgments about where to locate
unique green when presented with colored stimuli of a particular wavelength.
2. Categorical variation implies comparative variation: If normal observers dis-
agree in their judgments about where to locate unique green, then normal
observers disagree in their comparative judgments (x is greener than y) of
greenness.
3. Comparative variation: Normal observers disagree in their comparative judg-
ments (x is greener than y) of greenness.
4. Comparative ecumenism: There is no good reason to think that one normal
observer’s judgment that x is greener than y is veridical while another normal
observer’s judgment that x is not greener than y is not. Either both judgments are
veridical, or neither is.
5. Anti-irrealism: The idea that neither comparative judgment is veridical (perhaps
because colors don’t exist) is implausible.
6. So we have reason to think that both judgments (x is greener than y and x is not
greener than y) are veridical.
7. But if both judgments are veridical, then they must not contradict one another.
8. The best to way to reconcile the apparently contradictory judments (x is greener
than y vs. x is not greener than y) is. . .
If my argument about the ineliminability of a subject-relative element in defining
“closeness” in the truth conditions of comparative color judgments were right, then
Go´mez-Torrente wouldn’t have a non-subjective way of completing the argument
from interpersonal variation.18
4 Objections and Replies to the Comparative Argument
from Interpersonal Variation
Go´mez-Torrente (2015) offers several responses to my comparative version of the
argument from interpersonal variation. He summarizes his objections as follows:
The cases of disagreement on which [Hansen] builds his new subjectivist argu-
ment are, if they are not merely hypothetical, probably few and not evidently
relevant as test cases for a semantic theory; in particular, they strongly sug-
gest the possibility that some semantic indeterminacy is lurking. Finally, and
most importantly, even if there is no semantic indeterminacy involved, the dis-
agreements in question are not usable by the subjectivist, for they are relevantly
different in kind from the disagreements about positive [non-comparative] color
statements that subjectivists have often employed of late.
18Selectionism, however, would still provide an objectivist way of completing the comparative argument
from interpersonal variation.
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In this section, I’ll discuss each of Go´mez-Torrente’s three objections:
(a) the (merely) hypothetical nature of comparative disagreement
(b) lurking semantic indeterminacy
(c) comparative disagreements are different in kind from disagreements about
positive [non-comparative] color statements
Concerning (a), the hypothetical status of the kinds of comparative disagreement
that my argument depends on, Go´mez-Torrente says “I am not aware of experimen-
tal evidence showing that there are actual disagreements of this very specific kind
among normal perceivers, nor does [Hansen] provide references” (p. 3). That’s right. I
wasn’t relying on any existing experimental studies that explicitly concern these types
of disagreements (as opposed to disagreements about positive—non-comparative—
judgments about the location of the unique hues). But there is evidence that I think
makes it reasonable to predict that such disagreements exist. In his discussion of the
experimental evidence of interpersonal variation in the location of the unique hues,
Kuehni (2004, pp. 161–162) writes:
Among the conclusions [to be drawn from facts about interpersonal variation
in the location of the unique hues] is that it is not justified, certainly not in case
of green and red, to assume that a mean UH [unique hue] can be considered
representative of humans. This raises questions about the degree of validity of
color appearance models. While no explicit data have yet been published the
impression is that for individual observers UH are not rotated one way or the
other against the mean in a simple manner. It means that the perceptual dis-
tances between unique hues may vary to a smaller or larger extent by observer.
This raises significant questions about color space scaling and color difference
evaluation. . . In a given quadrant one observer may be significantly more or less
sensitive to hue differences than another.
So even if observers agree about the location of unique green, we should expect that
at least some will disagree about the perceptual differences in different quadrants of
color space, which would lead directly to the kind of comparative disagreement that
I discuss in my comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation.
Go´mez-Torrente also worries (b) that the kind of comparative disagreements that
my argument relies on will be semantically indeterminate, and so not capable of
providing a robust challenge to his theory. He argues, both for “mild” and for color
adjectives, that comparative judgments give rise to indeterminacy when subjects are
asked to make comparative judgments about stimuli that fall on either side of the
relevant focal point standard. That is, there is no semantic fact of the matter when it
comes to cross-focal point comparisons.
Consider cross-focal point comparative judgments about “mild”. Suppose that the
living room is a mild 20◦C, while the kitchen is noticeably warmer (say 30◦C), and
the bedroom is noticeably cooler (say 15◦C) than the living room. If asked to judge
which is milder, the kitchen or the bedroom, Go´mez-Torrente thinks that normal sub-
jects should feel “hesitant and somewhat puzzled”, which he takes to be evidence
that such comparisons are indeterminate. I agree that cross-focal point comparisons
are (and feel) more cognitively complex than comparisons of stimuli that both fall on
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Fig. 6 Cross-focal point
comparative color judgment
the same side of the focal point. It’s easy, for example, to judge whether an unbear-
ably hot room or one that is slightly too hot is more mild, while it’s harder to judge
whether a chilly room is more mild than one that is too hot. The cross-focal point
judgment is harder to make because it involves working out not just a difference,
but a difference of differences: which is greater, the difference between the hot room
and the ideally mild room, or the difference between the chilly room and the ide-
ally mild room? That’s a more cognitively complex task, which I think accounts for
Go´mez-Torrente’s felt difficulty about such judgments. But the cognitive complex-
ity doesn’t make such judgments, whether about “mild”, or about color adjectives,
indeterminate.
I think an armchair experiment can help establish that cross-focal point compar-
ative color judgments are not indeterminate, at least for some judges. Consider the
pair of stimuli in Fig. 6, and ask yourself: which is greener?19
I think it’s not that difficult to judge which is greener (for me, the yellowish
green circle is greener), which is evidence that cross-focal point judgments are not
indeterminate in the way that Go´mez-Torrente alleges.20
Finally, and “most importantly” (c), Go´mez-Torrente thinks that there is a disanal-
ogy between disagreements about comparative color statements and disagreements
about positive statements. The purported disanalogy is that it is easier to see how,
when two observers disagree in their comparative color judgments, one of them can
be wrong. If that’s right, it would provide a way for Go´mez-Torrente to deny compar-
ative ecumenism while holding on to ecumenism in the non-comparative argument
from interpersonal variation.
The disanalogy is that while it’s not plausible that certain normal perceivers are
better at locating the unique hues, it is plausible that certain people can be better
“at comparing distances between wavelengths”. This is just a case in which cer-
tain normal observers “can make hue discriminations at a higher level of acuity than
19In the tikz rgb color system that I used to draw these circles, the blue-green circle has the values 0,1,0.6,
and the yellow-green circle has the values 0.7,1,0. So in the rgb color system, they are almost equidistant
(in the direction of blue and yellow, respectively) from unmixed green.
20A referee reports that he or she was undecided about which circle is greener. That might be because the
referee judges the circles to be equally green, which would explain the indecision in a way that is consistent
with there being a determinate fact about cross-focal-point comparisons, or it might be because there is
interpersonal variation in whether cross focal-point comparisons are determinate or not. See Hansen and
Chemla (2016) for examples of interpersonal variation in the way gradable adjectives are applied.
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others” (p. 5). For example, an especially acute observer who locates unique green
at 500nm might be able to judge that a 509nm stimulus is greener (closer to unique
green) than a 510nm stimulus, while a less acute observer (who also locates unique
green at 500nm) would judge both stimuli to be equally green. It looks like there is
a difference here that one observer is sensitive to that the other observer is simply
missing.
I grant that some people can be better at comparing distances between wave-
lengths. After all, there’s an objective test to see how good they are at it. But in
the case that I imagine (and which I think we have reason to think exists), the two
observers making contradictory comparative judgments are disagreeing over which
of two hues that are objectively equidistant from unique green is greener. In such
a situation, the objective measure of whose judgment is “closer” to unique green is
not going to help decide things—unless one is willing to maintain that both judges
are simply wrong about their comparative judgments, due to the fact that both hues
are equally green because they are objectively equidistant from what is judged to
be unique green.21 But this idea is in tension with the fact, which Go´mez-Torrente
acknowledges, that there are asymmetries in judges’ sensitivity to blue and yellow
stimuli: a 10nm difference on the yellow side of unique green will not typically be
perceived to be as close to unique green as a 10nm difference on the blue side of
unique green.
Go´mez-Torrente observes that, even if there is full determinacy in cross-focal point
comparisons, the truth conditions for such comparisons will be “somewhat more
complicated”, in such a way that, if correct, would make it possible to say that in
the case of comparative disagreement that is central to my argument, in which both
observers agree about the location of unique green but disagree about which of two
objectively equidistant hues is greener, one of the observers is judging truly and the
other is judging falsely. That would justify a denial of comparative ecumenism in
the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, blocking the
argument.
The complication involves holding that the notion of “closeness” to unique green
that is needed to give the truth conditions for comparative cross-focal point judgments
(x is greener than y) must involve more than just measuring the objective distances
(in nanometers, e.g.) between x and unique green and y and unique green and deter-
mining which is straightforwardly closer. Because “the yellowish greens probably
occupy a smaller zone of the objective dimension of hues than the bluish greens” (p.
6), and we’re more sensitive to small differences in the yellow portion of the visible
spectrum, the semantic notion of “closeness” required by his theory needs to incor-
porate a scaling factor that would apply to objective distances on the blue side of
green to bring them into alignment with objective distances on the yellow side of
green. Once the scaling factor is in place, it would be possible, for example, to say
that, for anyone who locates unique green at 500nm, a 490 (bluish green) stimulus
would be greener than a 510nm (yellowish green) stimulus, even though both stim-
uli are objectively equidistant from unique green (500nm), because the scaling factor
21Thanks to an anonymous referee for advocating this response.
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applied to distance from green on the blue-green side would result in a bluish green
490nm stimulus being “closer” to 500nm than a yellowish-green 510nm stimulus.22
I don’t think this way of responding to the central case in the comparative version
of the argument from interpersonal variation is satisfying. The scaling factor “f” that
Go´mez-Torrente builds into the truth conditions of comparative occurrences of color
adjectives makes Wy’s judgment 490nm is greener than 510nm come out true, and
Zed’s judgment 490nm is not greener than 510nm come out false. But where would
“f” come from, if not from an average of individual observers’ relative sensitivities
to objective differences in the blue-green part of the spectrum vs. their sensitivities
in the yellow-green part of the spectrum? There is just as little reason to think of the
scaling factor “f” that results from such an average as correct as there is to think that
average locations of the unique hues are correct. So there’s no reason to embrace
the idea that the scaling factor “f” could play a role in determining which of two
apparently contradictory comparative judgments is true in the way Go´mez-Torrente
needs it to in order to defend his objectivist position against the comparative version
of the argument from interpersonal variation.
5 A Better Response to the Comparative Argument from Interpersonal
Variation: a Subjective Scaling Factor and Multidimensionality
While I don’t think Go´mez-Torrente’s objections to the comparative argument from
interpersonal variation succeed, there is a response to the argument that seems com-
patible with Go´mez-Torrente’s overall approach, but which he does not consider. The
alternative response involves introducing another form of subjectivity into the way
the truth conditions of comparative color statements are fixed, while maintaining the
idea that the underlying dimension along which objects are compared in terms of hue
is an objective magnitude. As indicated by the passage fromKuehni quoted above, the
relevant scaling factor—needed to accommodate subjective variation in sensitivity
to different parts of the spectrum—will itself likely vary across different observers.
According to this proposal, subjective features will play a role not just in fixing what
the focal point of greenness is, but also what the relevant scaling factor is for what
counts as “closeness” on the bluish-green vs. yellowish-green sides of unique green.
A comparative statement (x is greener than y) will be true, therefore, just in case x
is closer to the relevant subjectively fixed unique green, where “closeness” to green
itself a subjectively fixed property. Zed may judge that 490nm light is closer to unique
22This is my translation of the following passage in Go´mez-Torrente (2015, p. 6): “On the other hand, in
the imagined case of UG and UG#, and utterance of ν is greener than ξ will be true just in case f · dg(h(ν))
< dg(h(ξ )), and so it will be true, given that f will be less than one. So UG’s utterance of ν is not greener
than ξ will be declared false and UG#’s utterance of ν is greener than ξ will be declared true”. In other
words: There are two observers, UG and UG#, who agree on the location of unique green (500nm, say), but
who disagree whether [490nm] is greener than [510nm] (UG denies it and UG# affirms it). An utterance
of [490nm] is greener than [510nm] will be true just in case the distance from unique green to 490nm,
multiplied by a scaling factor less than one, is less than the distance from unique green to 510nm. Since
the distance from 490nm to unique green (500nm), multiplied by a scaling factor less than one, is less than
the distance from unique green to 510nm, an utterance of [490nm] is greener than [510nm] is true.
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Fig. 7 Subjective ordering of an objective dimension (Zed)
green than 510nm light, because he is more sensitive to the yellow-green part of the
spectrum than to the blue-green part of the spectrum, and Wy may judge the reverse
because of the opposite sensitivity. But the resulting scales on which objects are
compared involves purely objective magnitudes, as represented in Figs. 7 and 8.
Figure 7 is a scale that represents twice the sensitivity to the yellow-green part of
the spectrum than to the blue-green part, and Fig. 8 represents the reverse. The two
scales order the underlying dimension in subject-specific ways—other subjects will
differ in terms of their relative sensitivities, and so will employ scales of greenness
with different orderings of degrees—but the degrees on the scale remain objective
magnitudes. Once such a scale is fixed, with 500nm as its maximum degree, the truth
conditions of comparative statements are straightforward: x is greener than y is true
just in case x has a greater degree on the relevant scale of greenness than y. According
to the scale in Fig. 7, for example, 490nm light is greener than both 485nm light, and
510nm light. The important point is that not only is the maximum degree on the scale
of greenness subjectively fixed, but the ordering of (objective) degrees on the scale
is also subjectively fixed.
But why is it possible to generate subjectively variable orderings of hue if the
underlying dimension of hue is just as objective as the underlying dimensions of
height, temperature, and cost, for which it is not possible to generate such subjectively
variable orderings? The answer is that hue, unlike height, temperature, and cost, is
multidimensional.
In Hansen (2015), I considered a way of responding to the comparative version of
the argument from interpersonal variation that invoked the idea of multidimensional-
ity. My response went as follows:
There are adjectives, like “big”, that order objects along obviously objective
dimensions, and for which there can be apparent disagreements about com-
parative judgments (of bigness), and for which the comparative judgments can
both be veridical. Wy and Zed might, for example, disagree over who is bigger:
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (2.18m, 102kg), or Hulk Hogan (2.01m, 137kg). If Wy’s
scale for “big” employs a scaling factor that assigns greater value to height
than mass, then he can veridically judge that Abdul-Jabbar is bigger than Hulk
Hogan. If Zed’s scale for “big” employs a scaling factor that assigns greater
Fig. 8 Subjective ordering of an objective dimension (Wy)
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value to to mass than to height, then he can veridically judge the reverse. Appar-
ent disagreement in comparative judgments about bigness can be explained in
terms of different weightings assigned to the objective dimensions that produce
the scale of bigness on which objects are ordered.
I dismissed this response, on the grounds that hue is a single dimension (as
opposed to color in general, which is often modeled using three dimensions: hue,
saturation, and lightness, for example), so I concluded that it wasn’t possible to hold
that color adjectives (when they are only tracking hue) are multidimensional (Hansen
2015, p. 7). But, following Barcelo´ (2016), I now think it is possible to think of hue
judgments like “x is green” as involving two different objective dimensions: a green-
rather-than-blue dimension and a green-rather-than-yellow dimension.23 Assuming
that judgments about hue are a (subjectively variable) function of the degrees that
objects have on both of those dimensions, then if two judges assign different weight-
ings to those two dimensions in their comparative judgments, they can generate the
subjective orderings of objective dimensions represented in Figs. 7–8, and thereby
explain how they can disagree whether x is greener than y, even when they both
agree about the location of unique green.24 That defuses the challenge posed by the
comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation.25
6 Conclusion
In Hansen (2015) I argued that comparative hue judgments pose a problem for a
promising objectivist response to the argument from interpersonal variation about the
location of the unique hues. Go´mez-Torrente (2015) offered three responses to my
comparative argument. In this paper, I have given reasons to think those responses
fail. But there is a better response to my previous argument, which explains the
variation in comparative judgments of hue in terms of differing subjective weight-
ings of objective underlying dimensions, thereby giving a more satisfying objectivist
23This possibility was also raised by Peter Pagin, Hanoch Ben-Yami, and Je´re´my Zehr in discussion.
24For a detailed semantic theory of multidimensionality that captures this kind of comparative variability,
see Solt (2016). Solt herself observes that “the individual dimensions that underlie such [lexical] entries
[for multidimensional adjectives] may themselves be objectively measurable; subjectivity derives from the
potential for variation in the choice of these dimensions and how they are combined” (Section 5.3).
25A referee wondered to what extent a relationalist, who holds that colors involve relations to perceiving
subjects, would be threatened by this more complicated semantics for color comparisons. The proposed
semantics for color comparisons doesn’t directly threaten a relationalist view of the colors, but it poses
an indirect threat by offering an objectivist alternative that is consistent with the interpersonal variation
data, which is standardly taken to support relationalism (bracketing alternative objectivist responses like
selectionism). But the proposed semantic theory does not provide a response to other versions of Cohen’s
“master argument form” for relationalism, where the variation is intra-subjective, or inter-species. So it
does not constitute a comprehensive objectivist response to relationalism. See Go´mez-Torrente (2016, p.
32 n. 2) for discussion.
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response to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation
about the location of the unique hues.
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